Act from a sense to duty
The German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) was one of the most important figures in modern philosophy. He was born in Königsberg, Prussia, where he lived most of his life and where he died. His education as a child was strict and religious. He studied the classics, then philosophy at the University of Königsberg. He started teaching there as a minor instructor, while publishing several scientific works. He eventually succeeded to become a professor of logic and metaphysics at the age of 46. Only then did he encounter the works of David Hume, the British philosopher, which shook him with their apparent skepticism. In response, he published in 1781 his first major book (Critique of Pure Reason), and in the next decade several other important books on several philosophical topics such as metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. He became internationally famous, and retired from the University of Königsberg at the age of 72. He never married, but was socially active and a popular teacher. He died after physical and mental decline at the age of 79.
The following text is adapted from Kant’s book Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), a central book in modern and contemporary philosophy of ethics. Kant argues here that what makes an action morally right is not its result (or intended result), as utlitarianists such as Bentham and Mill believe. This is because the same result can be achieved in an evil way. The only thing that is completely and unconditionally good is the good will. Therefore, what makes an action morally right is that the person does it with good will. But what is good will? Kant’s answer is that it is the intention (or will) to follow a moral duty, or “imperative.” But what is the moral imperative? Kant believes that there is one general moral imperative, and he gives it three formulations which he thinks are equivalent. The quotation below mentions two of these three formulations.
From Section 1
It is impossible to think of anything at all in the world – or indeed even beyond it – that could be considered good without qualification, except for a good will. Understanding, wit, judgment, whatever we call these talents of mind, or courage, resolution, perseverance, as qualities of temperament – all these are undoubtedly good and desirable in many respects. However, they can also be extremely evil and harmful if the will which uses of them, and which constitutes the person’s character, is not good. […] A good will is good not because of what it produces, and not just because it can achieve a certain goal, but simply because of the willing itself. In other words, the good will is good in itself…
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/> Therefore, the moral value of an action does not depend on the result expected from it, nor on any principle of action that involves the motivation to achieve this expected result. Because all these results […] could have been produced by alternative causes, so that the will of rational beings would not be necessary, whereas the highest and unconditional good can be found only in such a will. The distinguished good which we call “moral” can therefore consist only of the conception of a [moral] law in itself – something that is certainly possible only in a rational being […].
But what kind of law can this be, that would guide the will even regardless of its expected results, so that the will would be called good absolutely and without qualification? Since I have excluded the possibility that the will would be motivated by satisfaction arising from obeying the law, there remains nothing but the conformity of actions with a universal law, and only this would serve as the principle guiding the will. In other words: Always act according to the principle which you could want to become a universal law.
Here it is the mere conformity with law in general, without assuming any particular law that applies to particular actions, that serves as the principle that guides the will. And it must be like that if duty is not to be an empty delusion and a chimerical concept. People’s common reason in its practical judgments perfectly agrees with the principle I suggested, and always has it before its eyes.
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From Section 2
/>Now I say that a human being – and in general every rational being – exists as an end in itself, and he is not just a means that can be used by some will for its own purpose. Instead, the human being must always be regarded also as an end, in all his actions, whether they concern him or any other rational beings.
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If there is a supreme practical principle, or categorical imperative, then since it necessarily applies to everyone because everyone is an end in itself, this principle would be an objective principle of the will, and it could therefore serve as a universal practical law. The foundation of this principle is: Rational nature exists as an end in itself. The human being necessarily understands his own existence in this way – so far it is thus a subjective principle of human actions. But every other rational being also understands his existence in this way, just on the same rational principle that holds for me. Therefore, it is at the same time an objective principle, and as a supreme practical ground it must determine all the laws of the will. Therefore, the practical imperative will be as follows: Act in such a way that you would always use humanity, whether in yourself or in any other person, also as an end, and never just as a means.
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